Abstract. Significant difference between response to real and hypothetical valuation questions is often referred to as hypothetical bias. Some economists have had success with using ''cheap talk'' (which entails reading a script that explicitly highlights the hypothetical bias problem before participants make any decisions) as a means of generating unbiased responses in a referendum format. In this article, we test the robustness of cheap talk using a voluntary contribution mechanism with a provision point over a wide range of possible payment amounts. Our results confirm the existence of hypothetical bias, and suggest that cheap talk may eliminate hypothetical bias, but only for respondents facing higher payments.
Introduction
There is strong empirical evidence suggesting that the contingent valuation method (CVM) often overstates real economic value. For example, in a review of the literature, Harrison and Rutstro¨m (forthcoming) found that 34 of 39 CVM estimates reviewed contained hypothetical bias with an average bias of about 338%. These results are consistent with those in meta-analyses by List and Gallet (2001) , and Murphy et al. (2005) .
This problem has motivated research to develop techniques that either eliminate or adjust for hypothetical bias. Of particular interest is the ''cheap talk'' CVM design recently employed by Cummings and Taylor (1999) (hereafter C&T) wherein experimental subjects were read a script describing the bias problem and were explicitly asked to not overstate their true Is Cheap Talk Effective at Eliminating Hypothetical Bias in a Provision Point Mechanism?
willingness to pay (WTP). C&T were successful in using the cheap talk design to eliminate hypothetical bias in a referendum for three different public goods. However, the evidence about cheap talk's robustness is mixed. Cummings et al. (1995a, b) found that a shortened version of the script actually worsens the bias, but a lengthier script similar to that in Cummings and Taylor (1999) was successful. Similarly, Poe et al. (2002) tested a shortened version of the cheap talk script in a voluntary contribution telephone survey and found that the short script had no effect. Conversely, Aadland and Caplan (2003) find that a short cheap talk script was effective. List (2001) reports that a long script did not reduce hypothetical bias with experienced card dealers, but was effective with inexperienced participants; both Lusk (2003) , and Aadland and Caplan (2003) report similar results. Brown et al. (2003a, b) found that the long cheap talk script was successful in a referendum, but only for higher payment amounts.
The simplicity of cheap talk makes it an attractive approach in minimizing hypothetical bias; however, it is important to understand how it works under different contexts. Whereas C&T, and Brown et al. (2003a, b) use a referendum, this article tests the ability of cheap talk to elicit actual values for a public good using a dichotomous choice format in a voluntary contribution mechanism with a provision point (PPM). Although frequently used in CVM studies, voluntary contribution mechanisms are often thought to be neither incentive compatible nor demand revealing (Berrens et al. 2002; Poe et al. 2002) . Consequently, a concern here is that voluntary contribution mechanisms may exacerbate hypothetical bias because of free-riding associated with actual contributions.
Although the voluntary contribution mechanism is not incentive compatible, experimental evidence has consistently shown that pure free-riding occurs far less than predicted by expected utility theory (see Ledyard 1995 for a summary of the literature). To reduce any free-riding effects, we use a modified voluntary contribution mechanism that incorporates a one-shot provision point with a money-back guarantee if the provision point is not met (Rondeau et al. 1999) . Benefits are extended if the provision point is exceeded. Issac et al. (1989) , Rondeau et al. (1999) , and Marks and Croson (1998) show that the PPM significantly increases voluntary contributions. Rondeau et al. (1999) , and Rose et al. (2002) observe approximately demand revealing behavior with a provision point mechanism and that it is generally more efficient than a simple VCM, with a few minor exceptions.
Voluntary contribution mechanisms are important because they are widely used and may often be the only plausible way of financing some types of goods, such as local public goods (Berrens et al. 2002; Champ et al. 1997) . Moreover, theoretically incentive compatible mechanisms, such as a referendum, are not without disadvantages. Even if a referendum were a credible means of generating the revenue to provide the good, the NOAA panel recognizes that the referendum itself is still hypothetical, and respondents may not believe that the payment vehicle (e.g., taxes, higher prices, etc.) will be implemented (Arrow et al. 1993) . In addition, the NOAA panel notes that respondents may not expect their votes to influence the outcome. Moreover, respondents may object to mandatory payments, possibly for selfish reasons or because they do not wish to impose a cost on those who would not otherwise contribute voluntarily (Champ et al. 1997) . Clearly, the researcher has no taxing authority, so compulsory payments, if the referendum were to pass, are not only problematic for field studies, but can also generate ill-will in laboratory settings with students who may be involuntarily forced to relinquish money earned for participating. Perhaps most importantly, despite the theoretical advantages of the referendum format in eliminating free-riding, empirical evidence suggests that hypothetical bias persists (Cummings et al. 1995a (Cummings et al. , b, 1997 Taylor 1998; Brown et al. 2003) , and the complexities involved in applying corrective mechanisms in the field are often overwhelming (Rondeau et al. 1999 ).
An issue particularly relevant to this paper is that cheap talk may only work well for higher payment levels. C&T used only one payment level ($10), whereas Brown et al. (2003a, b) varied payment amounts between $1 and $8. They found that for referenda, cheap talk eliminated hypothetical bias associated with $5 and $8 payments, but cheap talk had very little effect on lower levels. However, their payment range ($1-$8) is rather narrow and if cheap talk is to be used in a dichotomous choice framework, it is important to determine its impact over a much wider range of values and in a voluntary contribution setting.
Consequently, in this article we test the robustness of the C&T cheap talk procedure for eliminating hypothetical bias associated with provision of a local public good in a voluntary contribution setting over a relatively wide range of dichotomous choice payments. Our results indicate that the cheap talk script as used by C&T appears to eliminate hypothetical bias, but only for higher payment levels.
Experimental Design
Our experimental design closely follows that of C&T and Brown et al. (2003a, b) with three important differences: (1) we use a PPM whereas C&T and Brown et al. employed a referendum, (2) each subject was asked to respond to a randomly selected contribution level between $3 and $30, 1 and (3) we asked survey participants a series of follow-up questions that explored the nature of their decision-making process and reaction to the cheap talk script. In addition, our experiments were conducted in a computer lab, whereas the C&T experiments were hand-run (we expect that this last difference should not affect the results significantly).
Participants were recruited from the undergraduate population at the University of Massachusetts and randomly assigned to one of the three treatments. There were multiple sessions for each treatment, and group size varied between 4 and 17; subjects were not told the total number of experiment participants. The good used in this study was a voluntary contribution to the Massachusetts Chapter of the Nature Conservancy for the specific purpose of placing signs in and around Mt. Toby (about 7 miles from the university) to mark trails as well as rare and endangered species. To mitigate incentives for free-riding, a $500 provision point was incorporated. Participants were told that their money would be refunded if $500 were not raised, and that benefits would be extended if the provision point were exceeded. Participants were then asked a dichotomous choice willingness to pay question with the amount asked varying randomly between 3 and 30 dollars 2 :
''Are you willing to contribute $ --to the Nature Conservancy so that signs can be placed in and around Mt. Toby identifying the trails and rare species?''
The computer replaced the blank in the above payment question with the appropriate dollar amount and subjects were unaware of the amounts others were asked to pay. Participants were also asked a series of demographic and follow-up questions. The follow-up questions were designed to gather information about each participant's decision-making process. All questions were presented sequentially, so respondents were unaware of the content of the upcoming questions. Once a question was answered, respondents could not return to a question. The survey, which was computerized, took approximately 20 minutes to complete, after which the participants were paid a $10 show-up fee.
The 3 Â 2 experimental design is shown in Table I ; each cell contains the number of observations for each treatment. To test for possible ''found money'' or ''house money'' effects, the CVM-only and Auction + CVM treatments required different amounts of time and effort from participants. Following C&T, the purpose of the auction was to get participants to work so that they felt as though they earned the money they received for participating in the experiments, and will therefore treat it as their own money. In the auction stage, subjects participated in the buying and selling of a fictitious commodity in which they could earn money in addition to the $10 show-up payment. This auction for a fictitious good had no relation with the good being valued or the CVM survey, but it provided participants with an opportunity to earn slightly more money (average auction earnings were about $1) for an additional 30 minutes in the lab. The CVM-only participants only participated in the CVM computer survey.
The remaining treatment variable in Table I describes the type of survey environment participants experienced: real payment, hypothetical payment, or hypothetical payment with cheap talk. 3 We will refer to these treatments as Real, Hypothetical and Cheap Talk, respectively. In each treatment, the good was described in the same way and the provision rule was the same (the instructions are in Appendix A). The only difference among treatments was whether contributions would be real or hypothetical, and whether the cheap talk script was read to the participants in a hypothetical payment setting (see Appendix B for cheap talk script).
In the Hypothetical treatment, participants were told that they would not have to pay any money, but that they should respond to the valuation question as though they would have to pay today. Participants were asked the same dichotomous choice voluntary contribution willingness to pay question in the Real treatment but, at the end of the session, they were required to actually pay the amount they indicated they would be willing to contribute. For the Cheap Talk sessions, participants were given the same survey as the participants in the Hypothetical treatment, except there was an additional cheap talk script that was read to them by the experimenter before the WTP question was posed. This cheap talk script was similar to that used by C&T with minor wording changes to account for the provision point mechanism instead of a referendum format.
In a homegrown value study, such as this, it is impossible to know an individual's true preferences. Therefore, consistent with similar experimental valuation studies, we make the assumption that payments in the Real treatment accurately reflect the true economic value for the good. Recent work by List et al. (2004) cast some doubt on the validity of this assumption. They find that social isolation can have considerable influence on stated preferences, but that the difference between real and hypothetical values is roughly constant across treatments. This implies that although our response rates may be biased upwards, it should have no qualitative effects on our conclusions.
Results
The basic results from our experiments are presented in Table II . Despite a preexperiment survey that indicated strong support for Nature Conservancy programs, in the Real treatment there were only 2 ''yes'' responses. The unexpected result that the good appears to have relatively little value provides us with the opportunity to test cheap talk in a much simpler setting. In a typical valuation survey, the payment response can be divided into two decisions: (1) do I value this good at all? and (2) if so, how much am I willing to pay? This decision sequence is sometimes estimated using a hurdle model. Opaluch and Segerson (1989) note that for unfamiliar goods, individuals may not know precisely their WTP, but can place it within a range, or ambivalence region. Hence, should the amount asked fall within this region, the person may become more uncertain about her response. When payments are real, the respondent may invest more cognitive effort to reduce the ambivalence region. This could lead to different responses in real and hypothetical settings. The rationale behind the cheap talk script is to coax individuals to invest this cognitive effort even though payment is hypothetical. In our experiment, subjects typically earned $10-$12 for about an hour of their time. For the higher payment amounts, above $9, a ''yes'' response means that the subject would earn nothing and could possibly have to contribute more than they earned. Given that real WTP approaches zero, for these individuals, it is likely that these higher amounts asked lay outside the ambivalence region. Therefore, the contribution decision in either the hypothetical or the cheap talk setting should have been straightforward -the amount asked differs substantially from the good's value, so respond ''no''. However, this is not what we observe in Table II . Overall, the percentage of participants giving a ''yes'' response to the dichotomous choice question in the Hypothetical treatment (32%) was much greater than in the Real treatment (3%). The cheap talk script appears to be effective only at the higher payment levels. For $3 and $6 payments, however, cheap talk does not appear to have achieved its goal -half the Cheap Talk participants responded ''yes'' as opposed to only 11% in the Real treatment. These findings, as expected, strongly suggest the presence of hypothetical bias. Table III presents the results of two logit models in which the binary contribution decision (1¼ ''yes'' response to contribution question) is a function of the amount the subject was asked to pay, and dummy variables for the Real and cheap Talk treatments. The expanded model also includes a dummy variable for the Auction + CVM treatment along with social-economic characteristics similar to those in C&T.
In both models, the coefficient for Real is negative and highly significant confirming the presence of hypothetical bias. The next issue to be examined is whether the C&T cheap talk script was effective in eliminating this hypothetical bias. For both models, a test of the null hypothesis that Real¼Cheap Talk is rejected at the 5% level of significance indicating that the probability of contributing in the Cheap Talk treatment is different from that in the Real treatment when the entire range of dollar amounts is considered. In addition, since the coefficient on Cheap Talk in the expanded model is not statistically significant, this model suggests that cheap talk had no effect on hypothetical responses.
The five variables omitted in the condensed model were not jointly significant in the expanded model (v 2 ¼ 4.09, P-value ¼ 0.54). The rationale for the condensed model is that since the amount asked varied across subjects, it is possible that controlling for bid level, rather than the non-significant socio-economic variables, is driving the equivalence between the Cheap Talk and Hypothetical treatments in the expanded model. The primary results of the condensed model are consistent with the expanded model: the coefficient on Real is significant, and a test of the null hypothesis that Real = Cheap Talk is rejected at the 5% level. However, the Cheap Talk coefficient is significant, indicating that the script had some effect in reducing the bias, but the reduction was not sufficient to bring hypothetical payment responses in line with the real payment responses.
The model in Table III also includes a dummy variable for whether the individual participated in the auction. This coefficient is not statistically significant which suggests that either there were no found money effects, or the found money effects were the same across both the Auction + CVM and CVM only treatments. This is consistent with both Clark (2002) and List (2004) who found no evidence of found money effects in public goods experiments.
The logit results in Table III indicate that when taken over all payment amounts, cheap talk reduced the percentage of subjects giving ''yes'' responses relative to subjects in the hypothetical situation without cheap talk, but did not bring these responses in line with the real payment condition. Using the approach in Brown et al. (2003a, b) , Table IV presents the results from a series of Fisher's exact P-value tests to determine whether the effectiveness of cheap talk is sensitive to the payment amount. These tests make pairwise comparisons of the treatments while holding the payment level constant. To ensure sufficient observations for a meaningful test, we combined adjacent dollar amounts. When all dollar amounts are pooled, the results in Table IV are consistent with the logit results -there is a statistically significant difference between the real and cheap talk treatments. However, this conclusion is sensitive to the amount asked. Cheap talk appears to be ineffective for payments of $3 or $6, but is able to align real and hypothetical responses with higher dollar amounts. Thus, it appears that Brown et al. (2003a, b) result is robust across both referenda and PPM. 4 It is worth noting that a recent meta analysis (Murphy et al., forthcoming) reports median real and hypothetical CV values in similar experimental settings of $3.67 and $7.18, respectively. These values fall within the range where the effectiveness of cheap talk may be limited in our study.
The next issue to be addressed is why the cheap talk script was successful in eliminating hypothetical bias for higher but not for lower payment levels. Brown et al. suggest that some respondents may have believed they would not vote against a referendum at low payment levels. ''That is, they may not have envisioned significant bias at that level, leaving them less susceptible to the script.'' However, interpreting our results is somewhat more complex because there are well-known theoretical reasons why individuals may behave differently in a voluntary contribution as compared to a referendum valuation format (Hoehn and Randall 1987) . Taylor (1998) points out that if ''the realpayment experiment is not demand revealing, then differences in responses to hypothetical and real valuation questions could be due to free-riding in the real-payment scenario and not due to hypothetical bias in the hypothetical survey.'' In fact, C&T note that their evidence of hypothetical bias could actually be due to free-riding since their referenda are not strictly closed. Taylor (1998) did conduct a subsequent closed referenda for one of the goods and reported results similar to those found in the C&T open referendum. However, since the voluntary contribution mechanism used in our study is not necessarily incentive compatible, it is important to determine whether results of our real treatments were biased downward because of free-riding.
To test for free-riding behavior, we asked each subject a series of followup questions. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1-10 the extent to which the following statement influenced their decision about how much to pay: ''Since others will pay, I do not need to contribute as much.'' Subjects were also asked to indicate on a scale of 1-10 the degree to which they agreed with the statement that ''most other people will contribute less than what (the good) is really worth to them because they will be able to enjoy the benefits, regardless of how much they contribute.'' We also asked whether the respondent's decision on how much to pay depended on what they thought others would do, and whether they would change their payment decision if they knew exactly what others had paid. Table V summarizes the responses to these follow-up questions. Most respondents were neutral with respect to the likelihood that others would free-ride, and report that free-riding had very little influence on their own payment decision; a very small percentage of respondents said that their decision about how much to pay depended on what they thought others would pay. These results suggest that there is very little evidence of free-riding behavior in our experiments and are consistent with the observations of Ethier et al. (2000) and Rondeau et al. (1999) that a PPM can approximate actual demand in experimental settings. Even if freeriding behavior exists in our subjects' responses, the resulting free-rider bias in our WTP estimates would likely be the same in all three treatments and any differences in WTP should be due to the hypothetical nature of the valuation question. 5 Consequently, we believe that the observed difference in responses to our Real, Hypothetical, and Cheap Talk treatments is primarily due to hypothetical bias and not freeriding. 6 However, we are unable to completely eliminate the possibility that freeriding contributed to the hypothetical bias observed in this study. Moreover, as noted by one reviewer, some respondents may have felt that voluntary contributions are not a fair way to fund public goods. If concerns about fairness have a greater affect on real than on hypothetical responses, then hypothetical bias in a voluntary contribution setting may be related to both free riding and concern about fairness. Since the C&T cheap talk script does not attempt to address either of these issues, cheap talk may not be as effective in a voluntary contribution setting relative to the traditional referendum context.
On the other hand, subjects were also asked follow-up questions to determine whether and how the cheap talk script may have influenced their responses. When asked whether cheap talk influenced individual's contribution decisions, about 56% of respondents reported that they had reduced their payment in response to cheap talk. However, about 44% stated that they had already carefully considered their contribution decision and that they were, therefore, not affected by the cheap talk script.
Conclusions
Although additional testing of the cheap talk approach is clearly needed, the results reported here suggest that the effectiveness of this method, at least in its present form, may be somewhat limited. It is likely that a number of factors affect hypothetical bias and therefore no single technique will be the ''magic bullet'' that eliminates this bias. Ultimately, mitigating hypothetical bias will probably involve a combination of techniques, including both instrument and statistical calibration. We also recognize that practical considerations, such as budget and time constraints, may limit the ability of some CVM studies to implement more complex instruments (particularly if laboratory experiments, such as those conducted by Fox et al. (1998) , are necessary for calibration). For CVM studies conducted with limited resources, there may be an interest in ''short cuts'' that are ''reasonably'' effective. Consistent with Brown et al. (2003a, b) , our results suggest that cheap talk is effective in a PPM, but only at higher payment levels. The cheap talk literature suggests that cheap talk's effectiveness may be sensitive to script length, subject experience with the good, and payment amounts. Therefore, further research is necessary to develop a better understanding of underlying causes of hypothetical bias and how it is affected by cheap talk. We conclude that cheap talk may have the potential to achieve its objective, but the approach should be used with caution.
